After the Blackhawk is shot down, Bartlet attends a briefing in the Sit Room. He voices his desire to "wipe out" the drug lord responsible for the shooting and the kidnapping of the five DEA agents. In response, he is told two facts: (1) he needs 10:1 numerical superiority over the drug lord (200,000-300,000 troops vs. 20,000), and (2) that half of the forces will be casualties. Now, I'm not a military expert, but I've done quite a bit of research and reading into the subject.

The briefer refers to the Gulf War (1990-91). Now, numbers are sketchy for the Iraqis, but the Coalition forces numbered about 640,000. However, this includes 100,000 Turkish troops along Iraq's northern border, so the number of troops actively fighting was approximately 540,000, compared to about 545,000-600,000 Iraqis. It appears that the Coalition (US, UK, Canada, France, etc.) were at best evenly matched, and in the extreme case were outnumbered. Yet the result was that, for less than 1,000 Coalition deaths, the Iraqis lost between 50,000 and 100,000 soldiers. And nobody can dispute that victory was swift and absolute. (Only a miscalculation at the end of the war, based on a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] that predicted that the Iraqis would rise against Hussein and overthrow him in a coup because of the military losses, prevented the removal of Hussein. Militarily, the Coalition was in a position to remove Hussein by force.)

The Second Gulf War is little different. Coalition forces numbered 263,000 at peak strength, compared to 375,000 Iraqi regular forces. Yet the war was over quickly. (The aftermath, what we face today, is a different story. There simply aren't enough troops on the ground to hold the country securely. Yet, 10:1 would mean that the Coalition would need to field 4,000,000+ troops, and nobody has called for those numbers.) And, while the news seems bleak, the truth is that, for less than 3,000 Coalition deaths, 70,000-100,000 enemy combatants--regular soldiers or insurgents--are either dead or jailed.

I guess the point is that those numbers given to Bartlet are bogus. While some might think of the jungles of Colombia as similar to Vietnam, this isn't the case. The Viet Cong were expert fighters, trained in guerilla warfare. They had networks of tunnels, secret supply dumps, hidden trails through the jungle, and help in the form of local villagers. The druggies, on the other hand, are beneath contempt. They are largely incompetent, their training level is low, and most damning of all, they think of themselves as gods among men. It would be child's play for a light infantry division, combined with airborne assaults and helicopter support from Marine carriers in the ocean, to wipe these cocky SOBs out.